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Abstract: We examine how a comprehensive change in book-tax conformity affects firms’ 
reporting behavior. To this end, we exploit a Reform Act as a quasi-natural experiment which 
implied a decrease in book-tax conformity in Germany in 2010. In particular, this reform 
allows firms to exercise tax accounting options independently from financial accounting. Our 
study builds on a unique dataset of linked individual financial statements and actual tax return 
data. It covers roughly 150 incorporated firms for the years 2008 to 2012. Exploiting the 
exceptional change in conformity, we contribute to the ongoing debate on the impact of book-
tax conformity. Our results show that profitable companies, which have a clear tax sheltering 
incentive, actually use the newly introduced reporting leeway to manage taxable income 
downwards. This is especially attributable to companies exploiting favorable tax depreciation 
rules. Moreover, we find larger opportunistic tax reporting responses for small companies 
with less complex and predominantly domestic group structures. In addition, we observe that 
a decrease in book-tax conformity induces a decrease in the general persistence of taxable 
income, but at the same time gives rise to higher financial earnings persistence. This 
corroborates our finding of increased tax sheltering activity in post reform years.  
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1. Introduction 
There is an ongoing discussion among policymakers and academics on the costs and benefits 
of book-tax conformity. Particularly in the US, the question as to whether the link between 
financial and tax accounting should be tightened, has been debated intensely in the past 
decade (Desai (2003, 2005); Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)). Essentially, proponents of an 
increase in book-tax conformity (e.g. Desai (2005)) argue that a one-book system would offer 
less leeway for opportunistic reporting behavior, i.e. earnings management and/or tax 
sheltering, and thus increase the quality of disclosed earnings. Opponents of conformity (e.g. 
Hanlon et al. (2008)), by contrast, whilst invoking the divergent objectives and recipients of 
both financial and tax reporting, argue that an alignment of the two sets of accounts would 
result in the loss of valuable information and therefore give rise to a decline in earnings 
quality.  
The existing empirical evidence on the effects of book-tax conformity with regard to the 
extent of opportunistic reporting behavior and to earnings quality is not entirely unambiguous. 
There is, for example, no unanimity as to whether book-tax conformity leads to more or to 
less earnings management and tax sheltering (Blaylock et al. (2015); Tang (2014)). 
Furthermore, most studies find that the persistence of earnings is better in contexts of low 
conformity. However, at the same time, there is also evidence that large book-tax differences, 
which by intuition are rather to be expected in systems of low book-tax conformity, are 
indicative of earnings that are less persistent (Hanlon (2005)).  
With respect to the measurement of book-tax differences/book-tax conformity and the 
empirical assessment of their influence, the majority of studies have in common that they (i) 
use a proxy for taxable income and (ii) derive the impact from cross-country variation, cross-
firm variation or within-firm variation over time without an exogenous change of book-tax 
conformity legislation to identify its impact. In our study, we use a setting in which firms 
have been subject to a comprehensive change in conformity as a consequence of the 
Accounting Law Modernization Act (Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz (BilMoG)) in 
Germany. In addition, we employ a dataset of linked individual financial statements and 
actual tax return data, thus avoiding problems of approximating taxable income (Hanlon 
(2003)).  
The BilMoG reform entered into force in 2010 and constituted a considerable change with 
regard to the traditionally close relationship between financial and tax accounting in 
Germany. A major change brought about by this reform is that it enables firms to exercise tax 
accounting options independently from financial accounting. This allows companies to 
decrease their taxable income without simultaneously decreasing their financial income and 
therefore creates incentives for tax sheltering.  
Papers on a change in conformity are rare. Examples for partial modifications in the US 
setting include Dhaliwal and Wang (1992), Guenther et al. (1997) and Hanlon et al. (2008). 
More recently, Chan et al. (2010) and Chan et al. (2013) address a comprehensive change in 
conformity in China. We are, however, to the best of our knowledge, the first to exploit the 
transition from a one-book towards a more two-book oriented system in a European country 
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with a long-standing accounting tradition. In addition, and in contrast to most other studies 
using proxies for tax variables, we are able to observe the true taxable income in our data.  
We contribute to the existing literature on the impact of a change in book-tax conformity on 
reporting behavior. Firstly, we assess whether new reporting discretion resulting from the 
decrease in book-tax conformity is actually exploited despite additional requirements to 
document deviations between financial and tax accounting. Using individual financial and tax 
accounts allows us to attribute a change in book-tax differences to tax sheltering rather than to 
financial earnings management. Secondly, we examine how the change in book-tax 
conformity affects the persistence of taxable and financial income. We do so to gain further 
evidence that the newly introduced scope for opportunistic reporting behavior induces tax 
sheltering rather than earnings management. Moreover, we are thereby able to illustrate the 
interaction between book-tax conformity, book-tax differences and earnings quality.  
Our analysis proceeds in the following way. First, we illustrate the development of book-tax 
income differences graphically to get prior insights into whether a potential reform impact is 
visible in the data. In particular, we observe that the total book-tax income difference 
becomes positive (i.e. financial income exceeds taxable income) in the fiscal year 2010 which 
indicates opportunistic tax reporting behavior. The same applies to income differences 
relating to Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE). We interpret this as an indication that 
companies make beneficial use of deprecation options in order to decrease taxable income.  
In the empirical analysis, we directly exploit the 2010 reform in a difference-in-difference 
regression approach. Our results suggest that companies do indeed use the newly introduced 
discretionary reporting scope. More precisely, we find that profitable companies which face a 
clear tax sheltering incentive exhibit comparably higher book-tax differences subsequent to 
the decrease in conformity. We particularly trace this effect back to book-tax differences 
relating to PPE and thus to companies making use of favorable tax depreciation rules. 
Furthermore, we find that small firms featuring less complex and predominantly national 
group structures are more likely to engage in opportunistic tax reporting behavior.  
With respect to the persistence of taxable and financial income, our results suggest that a 
decrease in book-tax conformity leads to a decline in the persistence of taxable income which 
we attribute to the distortive impact of the newly arisen tax sheltering options. In contrast to 
that, we observe an increase in the persistence of financial accounting earnings. This rules out 
a possible influence of earnings management on our findings. Moreover, it demonstrates that 
both reporting lines contain distinct information, parts of which are lost in case of an 
alignment (Hanlon et al. (2005)). 
In terms of policy contribution, our results inform the debate on the effects of book-tax 
conformity with valuable findings from a quasi-experimental setting. In particular, we show 
that a switch from high to low conformity creates discretion for opportunistic reporting which 
is exploited for tax sheltering despite higher documentation costs. This finding speaks against 
a shift towards a two-book system. At the same time, we show that detaching financial and 
taxable income increases the persistence of financial income, thus suggesting an increased 
information content of financial earnings in a two-book system. This is reasonable, since 
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financial reporting numbers are no longer influenced by tax reporting objectives and there are 
no incentives for earnings management in individual financial statements. Essentially, the 
reduced persistence of post-reform taxable income, however, indicates that earnings quality 
deteriorates in a two-book system if incentives for opportunistic behavior are present. Hence, 
we conclude that a switch from high to low conformity increases opportunistic reporting 
behavior while not improving the information content with regard to those reported income 
numbers for which incentives for opportunistic behavior are present. 
The paper continues as follows: Section 2 discusses the related studies on the effects of book-
tax conformity and outlines how our study contributes to this strand of literature. Section 3 
provides an overview of the German institutional setting and of the change in book-tax 
conformity induced by the BilMoG-Reform Act. We describe our dataset in Section 4. 
Section 5 presents the descriptive and graphical analysis of book-tax income differences. 
Section 6 describes the empirical approach including hypothesis development and discusses 
the results. Subsection 6.1 refers to the analysis of a change in book-tax conformity on the 
book-tax income gap and tax sheltering whereas in Subsection 6.2 we investigate the 
relationship between book-tax conformity and the persistence of taxable and financial income. 
Finally, section 7 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
2.1 General book-tax conformity discussion 
In the last decade, the divergence of book and tax income in the US (Desai (2003), (2005); 
Mills et al. (2002); Plesko (2002); Manzon and Plesko (2002); Hanlon and Shevlin (2005)) 
and corporate reporting scandals such as the one concerning Enron, have led to an intense and 
ongoing debate as to whether or not financial accounting income and taxable income should 
be more strongly aligned. At the same time, however, several countries, including Germany, 
which have traditionally had a much higher degree of book-tax conformity than the US 
(Harris et al. (1994)), have recently moved towards a separation of financial and tax reporting. 
In Germany, this movement is aimed at achieving greater convergence with the IFRS and at 
enhancing financial statement comparability (Deutscher Bundestag (2008)). Moreover, given 
the traditionally close link between financial and tax reporting in Germany, it seems 
reasonable to assume that delinking the two reporting lines is further motivated by the 
German legislator’s aim to avoid the influence of an external standard setting board on tax 
law. 
Proponents1 (Desai (2003), (2005); Whitaker (2005); Shaviro (2009)) of increased book-tax 
conformity in particular point to managers’ reduced scope for aggressively reporting on both 
financial profits and taxable income. On the one hand, inflating earnings would entail an 
increase in tax payments; on the other hand, understating taxable income would imply 
reporting lower profits to shareholders and other capital market participants. Hence, book-tax 
conformity would constitute an incentive not to report opportunistically in either direction, but 
instead encourage firms to disclose an unbiased earnings number more closely approximating 
                                                     
1  For extensive discussions on the pros and cons of increased book-tax conformity, see Hanlon and Shevlin 
(2005); McClelland and Mills (2007); Hanlon and Maydew (2009). 
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their “true economic income”. Thus, the quality of reported earnings would be enhanced and 
the firms’ overall economic performance would become more transparent. Furthermore, the 
provision of one single set of rules could potentially lead to a reduction in compliance and 
administrative costs.  
Opponents (Hanlon et al. (2005); Hanlon and Shevlin (2005); Hanlon et al. (2008); 
McClelland and Mills (2007)) of an increase in book-tax conformity, however, refer to the 
divergent objectives of both reporting lines (Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)) and invoke one 
major disadvantage of conforming book and taxable income: a loss of information contained 
in earnings in particular for capital markets and therefore a decrease of earnings quality (also 
see subchapter 2.4). That argument is based on the notion that accounting earnings are 
intended to inform about firm performance, whereas tax law is driven by governments’ 
budgetary needs and other objectives. Moreover, Hanlon and Shevlin (2005) question the 
claim that conformity will actually reduce tax sheltering, reasoning that book income would 
most likely be conformed to tax income, thus creating strong incentives for tax competition.2 
Empirically, due to the lack of fundamental reforms of book-tax conformity, there is little 
direct evidence of the impact of changes in conformity on reporting behavior. As Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) point out, in “examining what would happen here in the U.S. if book-tax 
conformity were adopted, the ideal research design cannot be employed since the U.S. has not 
switched from a full book-tax conformity system to a non-conformed system (or vice versa)”. 
They, therefore, underline the potential of using systematic changes in book-tax conformity 
for further investigating reporting behavior before and after a change. The few existing papers 
based on US data address contexts in which book-tax conformity changed partially.  
One example is Dhaliwal and Wang (1992) who examine whether the book income 
adjustment, which became part of the annual minimum tax (AMT) system in 1987, alters 
financial reporting behavior. They find that the book income adjustment, according to which 
half of the difference between book and taxable income has to be included in the AMT tax 
base, prompts firms that are likely to be affected by the adjustment to shift income across 
years in order to reduce the AMT burden. In addition, Guenther et al. (1997) examine the 
financial reporting behavior of large, publicly traded firms that, following the enactment of 
the 1986 Tax Reform Act in the US, became subject to an increase in book-tax conformity 
due to a switch from the cash method to the accrual accounting method for tax purposes. They 
conclude that a stronger alignment of financial and tax reporting induced affected firms to 
defer financial accounting income.3  
In contrast to this setting of increasing conformity, Chan et al. (2010) examine the case of a 
decrease in book-tax conformity in China. More specifically, Chan et al. (2010) assess 
                                                     
2  Hanlon and Shevlin’s argument goes as follows: If book and tax income were to be conformed, it would be 
more likely that financial accounting income is conformed to taxable income, as Congress would probably 
not be willing to leave tax revenue determination to the Financial Accounting Standards Boards. If that holds 
true, market participants would know that the reported earnings are those on which tax is computed and 
would no longer rely on it as strongly as a source of information about firm performance. Hence, if it was 
clear that capital market participants do not any longer interpret earnings as performance measure anyway, 
firms would face an incentive to understate earnings in order to keep taxes low.   
3  Hanlon et al. (2008) build on this natural experiment as well. For more details, see 2.4. 
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whether a change of the financial reporting system from tax-based financial accounting 
towards the IFRS affects the informativeness of book-tax differences for tax non-compliance, 
i.e. the violation of tax rules. Indeed, they find that a decrease in conformity increases 
fraudulent tax reporting. In a further study exploiting the decrease in conformity in China, 
Chan et al. (2013) conclude that when book-tax conformity is reduced, larger firms pay 
proportionately less tax than smaller firms, i.e. they have greater ability to exploit the scope in 
independent tax reporting and thus save on tax payments.  
Apart from the paucity of exploitable institutional changes, only few papers are based on 
actual tax return data which is usually not available to the public. Examples of such studies 
building on tax return data include Lisowsky (2009), Mills (1996), Mills and Newberry 
(2001), Mills et al. (2002), Plesko (2007) and Chan (2010). However, the majority of 
empirical investigations rely on proxies for tax positions estimated from financial statements. 
For instance, in order to estimate taxable income, the current tax expense on the income 
statement is commonly grossed-up by the statutory tax rate. As Hanlon (2003) points out, this 
approach may, however, be subject to several estimation problems, as current tax expense and 
actual tax liability on the tax return usually do not correspond. Hanlon argues that additional 
disclosures would be necessary to more accurately determine taxable income from financial 
statements.  
2.2 Book-tax conformity, book-tax differences, tax sheltering and earnings management 
Book-tax differences relate to deterministic, legal differences between accounting standards 
and tax law and/or to discretionary differences attributable to incentives inherent in financial 
and tax reporting (Mills et al. (2002)). Various studies assess how (estimated) book-tax 
differences relate to aggressive tax reporting (e.g. Mills (1996), (1998); Manzon and Plesko 
(2002); Desai (2003); Desai and Dharmapala (2006)), whereas other papers (e.g. Philips et al. 
(2003); Lev and Nissim (2004); Hanlon et al. (2009)) attribute large book-tax differences to 
earnings management.4 Still other studies aim to consider both, earnings management and tax 
sheltering (Ayers et al. (2010); Blaylock et al. (2012), Seidman (2010)). In that regard, 
Badertscher et al. (2009) and Frank et al. (2009) find that some firms indeed report high book 
income to investors and low taxable income to tax authorities if both lines of reporting are not 
conformed. The question as to whether book-tax conformity leads to more or to less 
opportunistic reporting behavior remains, however, somewhat unclarified: Watrin et al. 
(2014) construct an index to capture international differences in book-tax conformity and 
conclude that firms operating in one-book systems (less scope for discretionary book-tax 
differences) conduct significantly more (upward) earnings management in their consolidated 
financial statements than firms which operate in an environment of low book-tax conformity. 
In line with these findings, Blaylock et al. (2015) conclude that book-tax conformity is 
associated with significantly more, not less, earnings management. By contrast, recent 
evidence by Tang (2014) suggests that high book-tax conformity deters overall earnings 
management and tax avoidance. This fits in with Coppens and Peek (2005) who establish that 
private firms in high conformity countries are less likely to engage in earnings management. 
Likewise, Salbador and Vendrzyk (2012) identify periods with differing levels of conformity 
                                                     
4  See Dechow et al. (2010) for a broad review of the earnings management literature. 
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across the years 1956 to 2010 and demonstrate that earnings management is more prevalent in 
low conformity periods.  
2.3 Book-tax differences and particular company features  
Additional studies investigate the extent to which book-tax differences and/or opportunistic 
reporting activities can be explained on the basis of particular company characteristics. Mills 
and Newberry (2001) find that public firms tend to exhibit larger book-tax differences than 
private firms and that these differences tend to be more positive for firms with larger 
profitability and more negative for unprofitable firms. Similarly, Mills et al. (2002) conclude 
that profitable firms and firms with multinational operations have larger book-tax income 
differences. They also find that the most significant increase in the gap between book and 
taxable income has occurred in the financial industry. This is in line with Plesko’s (2002) 
finding that book-tax differences are greater in the financial and information industries. In 
addition, Manzon and Plesko (2002) demonstrate that book-tax differences can be determined 
by the change in firm sales and the level of PPE. 
Finally, on the basis of confidential tax return data sourced from the Internal Revenue 
Service, Lisowsky (2010) develops a model to infer the likelihood that a firm engages in tax 
sheltering. Amongst other things, his results indicate that this likelihood positively correlates 
with firm profitability and size, but shows negative correlation with leverage. 
2.4 Book-tax conformity, book-tax differences and earnings quality  
Related to the issue of opportunistic reporting, a further strand of literature examines the 
association between book-tax conformity, book-tax differences and particular properties of 
(financial accounting) earnings quality, such as the persistence or value relevance of earnings. 
Studying earnings persistence as a feature of earnings quality builds on the notion that – if not 
reported opportunistically and thus truthfully reflecting the companies’ economic condition – 
earnings should have explanatory power with regard to future profits. Similarly, value 
relevance refers to the ability of disclosed earnings to capture firm value as reflected in stock 
market returns.  
Joos et al. (2000) find that stock returns are less correlated with earnings when book-tax 
differences are large and thus conclude that large book-tax differences negatively impact on 
earnings quality. Similarly, Lev and Nissim (2004) establish that large book-tax differences 
are correlated with lower earnings quality. Hanlon (2005) as well posits that large book-tax 
differences, as opposed to small book-tax differences, are indicative of less persistent 
earnings. More specifically, Blaylock et al. (2012) show that firms with large positive book-
tax differences, which can be attributed to upward earnings management, have lower earnings 
persistence than other firms with large positive book-tax differences. 
In addition, Hanlon et al. (2005) examine the relative and incremental information content of 
book and (estimated) taxable income. Studying the association between the two earnings 
figures and stock returns, they find that book income has higher explanatory power, but that 
both income measures exhibit incremental explanatory power. They therefore conclude that 
information content would be lost if the two income measures were conformed, thus 
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decreasing the quality of earnings. In line with that, Hanlon et al. (2008), building on the 
natural experiment first exploited by Guenther et al. (1997) (see Section 2.1.), find that an 
increase in conformity causes earnings to be less informative compared to earnings of firms 
that were not subject to the change in conformity. The authors argue that increased conformity 
deters earnings quality because rather than reflecting economically valuable information, 
earnings are reported such that taxes are minimized. This is in contrast to Desai’s (2005) 
suggestion that increased conformity can improve earnings quality by limiting earnings 
management. 
Finally, several cross-country studies examine the relation between country-specific factors, 
including book-tax conformity and earnings quality measures. Ali and Hwang (2000) as well 
as Guenther and Young (2000) conclude that financial accounting earnings feature lower 
value relevance in countries with high conformity. Likewise, Atwood et al. (2010) study the 
relationship between book-tax conformity and earnings persistence based on an index 
capturing the degree of book-tax conformity in various countries. Their evidence also 
suggests that earnings are less persistent in countries with high book-tax conformity. 
However, unlike these papers, Hung (2001) and Leuz et al. (2003) do not find any effect of 
book-tax conformity with regards to differences in the properties of earnings in their cross-
country studies. Moreover, intuitively the observation that larger book-tax differences 
negatively impact on earnings quality seems to be at odds with the predominant finding that 
the same negative effect applies to high book-tax conformity, since large book-tax differences 
would rather be expected in contexts of low conformity. In particular, this is somewhat 
confusing with regard to evidence building on indices for book-tax conformity such as the one 
by Atwood et al. (2010)5, Watrin et al. (2014) and Tang (2014) which are based (directly or 
indirectly) on book-tax differences.   
To sum up, existing empirical studies entail two major shortcomings: First, most papers - in 
absence of tax return data - use proxies for tax positions from financial statements which may 
be subject to several estimation problems. Second, only few studies observe an institutional 
change and can therefore demonstrate possible behavioral responses to changes in conformity. 
Essentially, we are able to overcome these concerns in our study. With regard to the research 
questions addressed, we shed new light on the impact of a change in book-tax conformity on 
reporting behavior in terms of tax sheltering. Moreover, we illustrate the interaction between 
book-tax conformity, book-tax differences and earnings quality.  
3. Institutional background 
Changes in the level of book-tax conformity in Germany 
The Accounting Law Modernization Act (Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz (BilMoG)), 
which entered into force in 2010 weakened the strong linkage between financial and tax 
                                                     
5  Atwood et al. (2010) argue that book-tax differences are greater for firms that operate in countries with lower 
book-tax conformity. They suggest that those larger book-tax differences result in more unexplained cross-
sectional variation in current tax expense. Therefore, they infer the degree of required conformity in a 
particular country from the amount of observed variation in current tax expense that cannot be explained by 
the variation in pre-tax earnings. 
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accounts in Germany. It can thus be considered to have induced a transition from a rather 
strict one-book system to a more two-book oriented system. 
Germany has traditionally been a high book-tax conformity country with one of the closest 
relationships between financial and tax accounting worldwide (Schön (2005); Lamb et al. 
(1998)). In that regard, the authoritative principle (Maßgeblichkeitsprinzip Sec. 5 (1) S. 1 
EStG) has been one of the major reasons for the strong linkage between the determination of 
financial and taxable income. This principle implies that the recognition and measurement 
policies applied in individual financial accounting basically have to be incorporated into tax 
accounting. The reverse authoritative principle (umgekehrte Maßgeblichkeit (Sec. 5 (1) S. 2 
EStG old version)) additionally stipulated that tax accounting options had to be exercised in 
accordance with financial accounting, i.e. if a firm made use of tax accounting advantages, the 
same values had to be recognized in financial accounts. If specific compulsory tax regulations 
superseded financial accounting, e.g. due to the different objectives of financial and tax 
accounts, it was, however, possible for deviations between financial and tax accounts to 
occur. Table 1 in the Appendix provides an overview of the authoritative principle and such 
possible deviations in the Pre-BilMoG era.   
Since the enactment of the reform, which abolished the reverse authoritative principle, it has 
been possible to exercise tax accounting options independently from the accounting treatment 
in individual financial statements. The changes in the authoritative principle induced by the 
BilMoG-Act are also listed in Table 1 (column “Post-BilMoG”, marked in green). 
The possibility of exercising tax accounting options independently comes, however, along 
with additional documentation requirements; namely the obligation to keep ongoing registers 
(Sec. 5 (1) S. 2 EStG) detailing the deviations between financial and tax accounts.  
Overall, the adjustment of the authoritative principle by the BilMoG-Act has led to greater 
leeway for companies’ decision-making when it comes to using tax accounting options 
advantageously without recognizing the same values in financial accounts. It is expected that 
this greater flexibility will lead to increased book-tax differences in Germany. 
Book-tax differences before and after the BilMoG-Act 
Balance sheet adjustments can generally be divided into deterministic and discretionary book-
tax differences. While the former arise from different mandatory regulations under tax and 
financial accounts, the latter are not compulsory but may result from an independent use of 
tax and/or financial accounting options. Such differences may therefore reflect opportunistic 
reporting behavior, namely earnings management or tax sheltering. Table 2 in the Appendix 
provides an overview of accounting items with book-tax differences before and after 
implementation of the BilMoG-Act under German law. Prior to the implementation of the 
BilMoG-Act, the majority of book-tax differences were deterministic or discretionary due to 
financial accounting options. Subsequent to the introduction of the BilMoG-Act, however, tax 
accounting options can now be exercised independently and therefore opportunistically, thus 
creating more leeway for discretionary book-tax differences in terms of tax sheltering. New 
potential powers of discretion (see Table 2, marked in green) have emerged especially with 
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respect to low-value assets, the valuation of inventories, the special item with reserve 
component6 and most importantly depreciation rules (regular and exceptional). As tax 
accounting options can be used independently regarding these reporting items, taxable income 
can be managed downwards without simultaneously decreasing financial income (Frank et al. 
(2009)). If managers make use of this new tax planning scope, it is expected that book-tax 
income differences will increase after the BilMoG-Act. Since the balance sheet adjustments 
described above are predominantly temporary in that they result from differences in the 
timing of income and expenses recognized under both accounting systems and should reverse 
at some point, the tax sheltering impact should be most prevalent directly after the 
introduction of the BilMoG-Act (2010) and diminish over time. 7 
In addition to these balance sheet adjustments, German tax law also enforces a number of 
permanent, mandatory off-balance sheet adjustments. These differences arise when a 
particular income or expense is accrued under tax accounting, but will never be recognized 
under financial accounting or vice versa. Examples are tax exempt dividend income according 
to Sec. 8b Corporate Income Tax Act (KStG), non-deductible expenses (Sec. 10 KStG) or 
investment allowances. The BilMoG-Act did not, however, change any regulations relevant to 
off-balance sheet adjustments, and these are not, therefore, a focus of our analysis. 
4. Data and sample characteristics 
We use a unique, anonymized linked sample of financial statements and tax return data for the 
years 2008 to 2012. Data was provided by Ernst & Young GmbH, Germany (EY). This is 
exceptional to the extent that tax return data is, in general, not publicly available in Germany. 
Although the Corporate income tax statistics contains micro level tax return data, this 
information is not published on a yearly basis as a panel and it is not possible to merge this 
tax data with financial statements or other firm characteristics. Our dataset, by contrast, 
comprises individual financial statements prepared under German Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (balance sheet, profit and loss statement) as well as tax balance sheets, 
tax reconciliations and tax declarations from tax returns. In addition, we requested that EY 
collect information regarding various firm characteristics, e.g. the firms’ industry affiliation or 
previous reorganizations. As the sample entails the years 2008 to 2012, our panel covers both 
pre- and post-reform years.  
Using tax return data linked with financial data enables us to compute actual book-tax balance 
sheet and book-tax income differences, rather than estimating these items on the basis of 
publicly available financial accounts. We can, therefore, overcome the discussed estimation 
problems and measurement errors and as such increase the power of statistical tests. 
Unlike the majority of other studies, in particular those based on US data, which examine 
consolidated financial statements, we use single financial statements. We consider this 
                                                     
6  German tax law grants, for example, a rollover relief for buildings (Sec. 6b EStG) or a replacement reserve 
under certain conditions (Sec. 6.6 EStR). 
7  In the US setting, there are more specific, permanent tax sheltering instruments (e.g. the valuation allowance, 
the tax contingency reserve, and the amount of foreign earnings designated as permanently reinvested) which 
have, however, no equivalent in Germany. For more details see Hanlon/Heitzman (2010); Graham et al. 
(2012). 
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approach appropriate for several reasons: First, taxable income is derived from individual 
accounts and the tax figure reported in consolidated accounts is aggregated from individual 
statements. It is thus straightforward to determine opportunistic tax reporting in individual 
accounts (Watrin et al. (2014)). Second, we can thus more clearly attribute changes in 
reporting behavior to tax sheltering, since earnings management that plays a role for listed 
firms and is more relevant for consolidated accounts should be less present in individual 
accounts due to lower capital market pressure. Third, the information content of financial 
income reported in individual accounts is still meaningful, since individual financial 
statements are relevant for determining the amount distributable as dividends to investors. 
In short, we asked EY to select incorporated firms covering six different industries, three 
different size classes (the definition of size classes follows Sec. 267 of the German 
Commercial Code) and different postal code areas. Due to divergent reporting requirements, 
we excluded banks, insurances and other financial institutions. Table 3 provides an overview 
of the distribution of the sample with regard to these parameters. The comparison with the 
entire population of German corporations in the German Corporate Income Tax statistics 
shows that our sample is biased towards large firms and that the Manufacturing sector is 
overrepresented, whereas our sample comprises fewer firms from the Construction and 
Services industries. This distortion can also be found in large commercial datasets such as 
Amadeus provided by Bureau van Dijk and is not unique to our sample of EY clients. It is 
most likely due to publication requirements. Furthermore, we cross-check our data by 
reference to the work of Watrin et al. (2014) who use a much broader dataset of European 
firms from the Amadeus database with a huge subset of German firms. They put forward a 
mean absolute value of approximated permanent book-tax differences of 0.0924 for Germany. 
If we replicate the construction of this proxy with our data, we obtain a similar value of 
0.0859. This leaves us confident that the results of our study are not more systematically 
biased than studies based on broader commercial data sets.  
Table 3: Sample distribution 
Industry  
Sample Population Size Sample  Population 
Frequency (Sec. 267 HGB) Frequency 
Manufacturing 30.46% 10.60% Small 9.46% 51.80% 
Construction 1.39% 9.40% Medium 44.78% 33.39% 
Trade 13.35% 16.70% Large 45.76% 14.82% 
Service and 
others8 54.8% 63.30%  
   
Total 100% 100% Total  100% 
Note: This table characterizes the data sample and compares the relative coverage of size classes and industries to the 
population of German corporations (Corporate income tax statistics, 2010). 
The initial sample consists of approximately 150 unique incorporated firms. The number of 
observations per year varies slightly as we do not have data covering the entire sample period 
                                                     
8  From the six industry categories covered in our sample, this category also comprises firms from the Energy 
and IT sector. We condense industries this way to attain comparability with the Corporate income tax 
statistics.  
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(five years: 2008-2012) for all firms (unbalanced panel). In total, our sample consists of 725 
firm-year observations. 
Our dataset enables us to identify deviations between financial and tax reporting at the level 
of single balance sheet items, both with respect to book-tax balance sheet and book-tax 
income differences. Book-tax balance sheet differences entail cumulative effects relating to 
accrual accounting decisions made in previous reporting periods. They do not, however, 
necessarily provide information on income differences relating to the current period. We 
therefore do not further analyze these positions. Book-tax income differences, by contrast, 
capture annual effects and can therefore be considered as a more suitable indicator for 
opportunistic reporting than balance sheet differences. In particular, they reflect how book 
income is adjusted in order to determine tax balance sheet income. Given that we are 
interested in differences between book and taxable income which relate to book-tax balance 
sheet differences, we do not, however, examine total book-tax income differences including 
off-balance sheet adjustments. As described in Section 3, off-balance sheet adjustments are, in 
principle, deterministic and are not related to accrual accounting. We therefore consider these 
to be irrelevant for our analysis of opportunistic tax reporting. Any following uses of the term 
“taxable income” actually refer to tax balance sheet income before off-balance sheet 
adjustments. 
5. Descriptive Evidence: Book-Tax Differences pre- and post-reform 
In Figure 1, we plot the total book-tax income difference scaled by total assets for the years 
2008-2012. The solid black line represents the sample mean, the dashed black line depicts the 
average for profitable firms and the dashed grey line the average for unprofitable firms. The 
book-tax difference turns positive if taxable income falls below financial income, thus 
potentially indicating aggressive tax reporting behavior. A negative book-tax difference, in 
turn, results if taxable income exceeds financial income. 
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Figure 1: Total book-tax income difference, scaled by total assets 
 
Note: This figure shows the mean total book-tax difference (scaled by total assets) over the sample period. The solid black 
line represents the sample mean, the dashed black line depicts the average for profitable firms and the dashed grey line the 
average for unprofitable firms.   
In the years 2008 and 2009, we observe negative book-tax differences. Strikingly, the overall 
book-tax difference becomes positive in the year 2010 when the implemented Reform Act 
introduced new reporting discretion. This suggests that the tax sheltering scope (i.e. to 
manage taxable income downwards without simultaneously decreasing financial accounting) 
is actually exploited. Since the newly introduced tax reporting discretion results in earlier 
recognition of tax expenses, the resulting timing effect reverses over time. In line with this, 
we observe that, from 2011 onwards, total book-tax differences once again become negative.  
Mills and Newberry (2001) posit that the incentive to decrease taxable income relative to 
book income depends on a firm’s profitability. In fact, firms accruing losses are unable to 
benefit from (further) negative earnings adjustments. By contrast, they may report in a way 
which delays advantageous tax accounting to profitable periods. Accordingly, we partition our 
sample into profitable and loss-making firms in order to assess differences in reporting 
behavior.  
As Figure 1 reveals, we indeed find quite opposite effects for the two types of firms. While 
profitable firms on average exhibit a positive book-tax difference in 2010 (book income 
exceeds tax income), loss-making firms accrue the largest negative difference in that year. In 
the subsequent years, the overall book-tax differences of profitable and unprofitable firms 
converge again.  
To gain insights into the drivers of the observed effect, Table 4 displays book-tax income 
differences for single balance sheet positions separately. We again compare mean scaled 
book-tax differences over the pre-reform years to those of the post-reform years in order to 
disclose the changes induced by the change in conformity. For each balance sheet item we 
additionally report the number of observations with non-zero values and whether the change 
of the book-tax differences is significantly different from zero (Table 4).  
-0.030
-0.025
-0.020
-0.015
-0.010
-0.005
0.000
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0.010
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Table 4: Mean book-tax income differences, scaled by total assets, pre- and post-reform 
    Pre-reform   Post-reform 
p   # 
Mean 
(%) Sd # 
Mean 
(%) Sd 
Fixed assets               
Intangible assets 45 0.08 0.0174 72 0.03 0.0148 0.7041
PPE 74 -0.21 0.0280 137 0.15 0.0256 0.1089
Financial assets 83 0.93 0.0658 148 -0.37 0.0526 0.0089
Current assets               
Inventories 27 0.03 0.0087 40 0.03 0.0081 0.9464
Receivables and other 
assets 124 0.18 0.0259 217 0.00 0.0240 0.3752
Securities 5 -0.01 0.0011 7 0.00 0.0006 0.1352
Special item 7 0. 005 0.0005 15 0.012 0.0018 0.5985
Provisions 181 -0.42 0.0290 302 0.03 0.0287 0.07
Liabilities 75 -0.43 0.0385 155 0.24 0.0486 0.0804
Total number of observations: 580 (pre-reform: 225; post-reform: 355)   
Note: This table contains the number of observations with non-zero values, mean book-tax income differences and standard 
deviations for single balance sheet positions, separated for the pre- and post-reform period. In the last column, it is reported 
whether the change of the book-tax differences is significantly different from zero.  
Most importantly, we find a negative mean income difference for PPE pre-reform, which 
becomes positive post-reform. The change in the book-tax income difference is almost 
significant at the 10% level.9 An (untabulated) assessment of the development of PPE-related 
book-tax income differences over the sample period reveals that the observed total effect is 
driven mainly by a comparably large positive book-tax difference in 2010 which becomes 
slightly negative in 2011 before once again turning positive in 2012. In contrast, book-tax 
differences are on average negative in the pre-reform years. Importantly, one has to note that 
favorable declining balance tax depreciation was only available until 2010 in Germany. 
Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that the effect in 2011 would be less negative, had 
declining balance depreciation still been available in that year. Overall, our findings for PPE 
suggest that companies do opportunistically make use of tax depreciation rules. 
Turning to inventories as a further balance sheet item offering new reporting discretion, we 
find a positive average income difference both pre- and post-reform (Table 4). We do not, 
however, observe a significant change in the two values. Likewise, there is only a minor 
change observable for the special item with reserve component. We therefore abstract from 
these two balance sheet items in our further analysis. 
The remaining balance sheet positions are predominantly driven by deterministic deviations. 
We find the largest mean scaled book-tax differences (both pre- and post-reform) for financial 
assets. More specifically, the difference pre-reform is positive, post-reform it is negative; the 
change in the difference is significant. We attribute this change to impairments, which are 
regulated more restrictively in tax accounting, i.e. non-permanent impairments may be 
                                                     
9  At this point, we again point to the relatively small sample size. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the 
reporting scope is solely related to new investments. As we would expect a comparably low level of 
investments in 2010 as a result of the financial crisis, we believe that the observed effect would be even more 
pronounced had 2010 been a year of economic expansion. 
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recognized in financial accounting, whereas their recognition is forbidden in tax accounting. 
We observe a strongly negative pre-reform book-tax difference for provisions, which 
becomes positive and smaller in absolute terms post-reform. The same development is 
observed for liabilities. We find rather minor and insignificant effects for intangibles, 
receivables and securities. 
To conclude, our descriptive analysis provides initial evidence that the discretionary scope in 
tax reporting, which arises from the decrease in book-tax conformity, is exercised. 
Furthermore, it suggests that deterministic differences are still material. Last, we acknowledge 
the fact that our sample period covers the financial crisis initiated in 2008. As Graham et al. 
(2012) note, the nature of findings pertaining to the direction of the book-tax income gap 
greatly depends on whether a study is carried out for a period of economic expansion or 
contraction. As we would expect fewer companies to be profitable and to carry out new 
investments, thus facing the possibility and incentive to engage in opportunistic tax reporting, 
in the years subsequent to the crisis, we argue that our results tend to be conservative. In other 
words, we believe that our results would be even more pronounced, had the sample period 
consistently been a period of economic expansion.  
6. Empirical analysis 
6.1. Change of book-tax conformity, the book-tax income gap, and tax sheltering 
The descriptive evidence indicates that companies seem to make use of the newly introduced 
discretionary reporting scope. The following empirical analysis exploits the reform scenario 
econometrically in a difference-in-difference setting to substantiate the analysis.  
Hypothesis Development and Research Design 
While the BilMoG-Act basically serves as natural experiment in our research design, the 
reform, in general, affected all German corporations. Accordingly, we do not observe a 
natural control group (which is not affected by the reform at all) in our setting. The implied 
tax reporting leeway is, however, most probably only exercised by companies that have a 
clear incentive for tax sheltering (Chan et al. (2013), p. 7). Hence, profitable companies which 
can make efficient use of tax deductions are more likely to take advantage of opportunistic 
reporting opportunities (Manzon and Plesko (2002), p. 194; Wilson (2009), p. 985-987; Frank 
et al. (2009), p. 475). Loss-making companies, however, are expected not to face tax-related 
reporting incentives (Chan et al. (2010); Mills and Newberry (2001); Manzon and Plesko 
(2002)) as these companies do not pay any taxes in the current period. Furthermore, the tax 
benefits resulting from loss carry-forwards in future years are less certain (Mills and 
Newberry (2001), p. 4f.). We therefore hypothesize the following: 
H 1: Book-tax income differences will increase for companies with incentives to use the 
new reporting discretion (profitable companies) compared to companies with no/less 
incentives (loss companies) subsequent to the implementation of the BilMoG-Act. 
In order to test our hypothesis and to examine the effect of a decrease in book-tax conformity 
on reporting behavior, we essentially use a differences-in-differences methodology. In the 
basic regression equation, we estimate 
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ሺ1ሻ 
where i indexes firms and t indexes time. The dependent variable BTDi,t is defined as total 
book-tax income difference (balance-sheet differences) scaled by total assets. We compare 
outcomes before and after the reform for a group affected by the policy change (treatment) to 
a group not affected by the change (control). As only profitable companies have a clear 
incentive to use (and are therefore affected by) the new discretionary reporting scope, we take 
Profitablei,t, a dummy variable which equals 1 for profitable firm-year observations (annual 
net income >= 0) and 0 for firm-year observations with a loss (annual net income < 0), as 
treatment variable. Profitable firms accordingly serve as treatment group; loss firms as control 
group in our analysis. As long as treatment and control groups are affected by time-varying 
confounding variables in a similar way, the difference in the two estimates will reflect the 
effect of the BilMoG-Act. In this regard, untabulated t-test results reveal that the change in the 
book-tax differences from year 2008 to 2009 is not significantly different for profitable and 
loss-making companies, which points to a similar development of book-tax differences in the 
pre-reform period. As the profitability of companies and therefore the incentive for tax 
sheltering might change from year to year, we basically consider a mover panel.10 We further 
include a dummy variable Reformt which equals 0 for years before the BilMoG-Act (2008-
2009) and 1 for years after the introduction of the BilMoG-Act (2010-2012). To ensure a 
comparable number of observations in the pre- and post-period, we restrict our main analysis 
to the years 2008-2011. The key interaction term of interest, Profitablei,t*Reformt, equals one 
for profitable firm-year observations starting in 2010, and zero otherwise. The coefficient ߙଷ 
represents the differences-in-differences estimator of introducing tax sheltering opportunities. 
Given that only companies with incentives are expected to make use of the new discretionary 
reporting scope, book-tax differences should comparatively increase in the treatment group 
subsequent to the implementation of the BilMoG-Act. We therefore expect ߙଷ to be positive 
(ߙଷ ൐ 0ሻ. 
In addition, we include several firm-level control variables ( ௜ܺ,௧ሻ which possibly influence the 
reporting gap. First, we add those balance sheet items for which new discretionary leeway is 
expected following the introduction of the BilMoG-Act: PPEi,t (PPE reported in financial 
statements scaled by total assets) and Inventoriesi,t (inventories reported in financial 
statements scaled by total assets).11 In addition, we include variables for which general 
substantive (mainly deterministic) differences between tax and financial accounting 
regulations in Germany exist. Following the descriptive analysis, and in view of previous 
research findings,12 we include Financialsi,t (financial assets reported in financial statements 
scaled by total assets), Provisionsi,t (provisions reported in financial statements scaled by total 
                                                     
10  For a detailed description of differences-in-differences analysis for cross-sections, mover and no-mover 
panels see Lee/Kang (2006). Moreover, the number of loss-firms per year is rather constant over the sample 
period and seems, therefore, not to be systematically influenced by the financial crisis. 
11  We ignore the special item with reserve component in our empirical analysis due to materiality reasons; the 
descriptive analysis has shown that only approx. 4% of firms in our sample recognize this balance sheet item. 
Furthermore, following the introduction of the BilMoG-Act, recognition is prohibited in financial accounts. 
12  See Zinn and Spengel (2012), Evers et al. (2014). 
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assets) as well as Leveragei,t13 (ratio of debt to equity capital). Furthermore, we add the 
dummy variable Reorganizationi,t which equals 1 if the firm has been reorganized within the 
last 5 years and 0 otherwise. The rationale behind this is that, according to the German Tax 
Reorganization Act (UmwStG)14, book-tax conformity is not required in privileged 
reorganizations, which may further increase the book-tax income gap. Finally, we include two 
firm characteristic variables. These are Sizei,t (natural logarithm of total assets reported in 
financial statements) and Liquidityi,t (ratio of current assets to accounts payable). The 
mentioned variables, in particular Liquidity and Leverage, are also intended to control for 
factors that potentially determine participation, i.e. the probability of a company being 
profitable or not in a given year, and shall therefore alleviate concerns about sample selection.  
Table 5 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics for our regression variables on a 
pooled basis as well as separated into data relating to the pre- and post-reform periods. The 
correlations among the explanatory variables (see correlation matrix in Table 6 in the 
Appendix) do not provide any indication of an unacceptable level of multicollinearity in the 
data.15 
Results 
Table 7 presents the results for regression equation (1).  
  
                                                     
13  Leverage also constitutes a proxy for a firm’s general capital structure (Chan et al. (2013)). 
14  For more details see Zinn and Spengel (2012), p. 17.  
15  According to Farrar and Glauber (1967) harmful levels of multicollinearity are not present until bivariate 
correlations exceed 0.8. 
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Table 7: Regression results 
  
Dependent Variable: Book-
tax income difference  
Variable Coefficient t-
statistic
Difference in Difference Design 
Reform -0.052 -1.61
  (0.032)   
Profitable 0.017 1.88 * 
  (0.009)   
Profitable*Reform 0.063 1.94  * 
  (0.032)   
Control Variables 
Variables for different tax and accounting rules 
PPE -0.012 -0.63
  (0.019) 
Inventories 0.018 0.35   
  (0.053)   
Financials -0.000 -0.02
  (0.017) 
Provisions -0.015 -1.18
  (0.013) 
Leverage -0.000 -1.40
(0.000) 
Reorganization -0.010 -0.90
(0.012) 
Variables for additional economic factors 
Size -0.002 -0.55
  (0.004) 
Liquidity -0.000 -0.52
(0.000)   
Intercept 0.020 0.34   
  (0.059)   
Observations n=436 
R2 0.08 
Note: This table presents the regression results using OLS. The dependent variable is BTD (income) scaled by total assets. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below coefficients. *,**,*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
We obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate (ߙଷሻ	for the interaction 
term (Profitable*Reform) in line with Hypothesis 1. Specifically, the effect of the treatment 
group amounts to 0.011 (Reform (-0.053) + Profitable*Reform (0.063)). This implies that the 
opening of new tax reporting scope significantly increased book-tax income differences for 
those companies that have a clear incentive for tax sheltering (profitable firms), relative to 
those companies without incentive (loss firms). They indeed seem to exploit the new 
discretionary reporting leeway to manage taxable income downwards without simultaneously 
decreasing financial income. This finding is basically in line with Tang (2014) who also finds 
that high book-tax conformity generally deters tax sheltering. 
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To assess the robustness of this finding, we examine further specifications and conduct 
additional tests (Table 8). First, we run our OLS regression with clustered standard errors at 
firm level (column (1)) instead of heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors to control for a 
potential correlation of outcomes within the unit/firms.16 To ensure that our results are not 
driven by differences between industries,17 we include industry fixed effects in column (2). 
The basic result (ߙଷሻ remains unchanged in the specifications. The untabulated industry 
dummies are not significant. While we consider only financial income profitability as 
treatment criteria in our main specification, we use a different definition including off-balance 
sheet adjustments in column (3). The intuition behind that is the following: Off-balance sheet 
adjustments can mainly be seen as a fixed non-manipulated component which has to be added 
to financial income anyway to end up with taxable income. Therefore, a company is only 
facing a clear balance sheet-based tax sheltering incentive if its financial income plus off-
balance sheet adjustments is positive. If, however, off-balance sheet adjustments already fully 
eat up financial profits, there might be no clear incentive to further reduce taxable income 
even if a company is considered profitable according to its profit and loss statement. The 
basic result (ߙଷ	positive and statistically significant) again holds for the alternative treatment 
definition. In column (4), we expand our basic sample by adding fiscal year 2012, thus 
accepting that there is no more symmetry in the number of pre- and post-reform observations. 
Whereas the difference-in-difference coefficient (ߙଷሻ	is still statistically significant and 
positive, its magnitude decreases. This is in line with the assumption that the tax sheltering 
impact should be most prevalent directly after the introduction of the BilMoG-Act (fiscal year 
2010) and should diminish and level out over time due to the reversal effect of temporary 
book-tax differences. In line with this argumentation, we include the lagged dependent 
variable (BTDt-1) as additional control in column (5) to test for a potential reversal effect.18 In 
this case as well, the main result (ߙଷሻ	remains basically unchanged. Beyond that, it is striking 
that the effect of the treatment group (Reform + Profitable*Reform) remains fairly stable (and 
ranges between 0.09 and 0.013) in all five specifications. Finally, we conduct additional 
placebo difference-in-difference tests. In order to do so, we, first of all, define 2009 (the year 
previous to the introduction of the BilMoG-Act) as placebo reform year and run our basic 
regression (1) for the pre-reform period (years 2008-2009). Second, we use book-tax 
differences relating to provisions and liabilities as alternative outcome variables. These should 
not be affected by the intervention as related deviations are of deterministic nature and there 
has been no new reporting leeway with regard to these balance sheet items subsequent to the 
introduction of the BilMoG-Act. As expected, we do not determine a significant reform 
effect, i.e. an increase in book-tax differences for profitable companies in columns (6), (7) and 
(8) (ߙଷ	not statistically and economically significant). This further demonstrates the validity 
of our findings. 
                                                     
16  OLS standard errors might understate the standard deviation of the DD estimator (Bertrand et al. (2004)). 
17  Mills et al. (2002) and Plesko (2002) find, for example, that book-tax differences are greater in the financial 
and information industries. 
18  See Manzon/Plesko (2002), p. 198; our panel is, therefore, restricted to the years 2009 to 2011 in this 
specification. 
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Table 8: Robustness tests 
Dependent Variable: Book-tax income difference
 (1) 
Clustered SE 
(firm level) 
(2) 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
(3) 
Profitability 
incl. off 
(4)  
Incl. 2012 
(5) 
Lagged 
dependent 
variable 
(6) 
Placebo Test: 
Reform Year 
2009 
(7) 
Placebo Test: 
Provisions 
(8) 
Placebo Test: 
Liabilities 
Reform -0.052  -0.054 * -0.033 -0.017 -0.039 * -0.002 -0.001 0.006
(0.035) (0.033) (0.021) (0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008)
Profitable 0.017 ** 0.019 ** 0.016 * 0.016 * 0.011 0.015 0.004 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.008)
Profitable*Reform 0.063 * 0.065 ** 0.046 ** 0.026 * 0.048 ** 0.009 0.007 0.003
(0.035) (0.033) (0.022) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016) (0.006) (0.010)
BTD t-1 -0.157   
(0.140)  
PPE -0.012 -0.013 -0.016 -0.016 -0.022 -0.004
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.026) (0.018)
Inventories 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.020 0.052 -0.019
(0.047) (0.052) (0.053) (0.042) (0.069) (0.026)
Financials -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 0.006 -0.009
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.021) (0.016)
Provisions -0.015 -0.018 -0.017 -0.024 ** -0.026 * -0.005 -0.020**
(0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009)
Leverage -0.000 * -0.000 * -0.000 * -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Reorganization -0.010 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012)
Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.005 * -0.000 -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Liquidity -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 ** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept -0.020 -0.013 0.009 0.003 0.070 -0.099 ** 0.002 0.042
(0.041) (0.068) (0.059) (0.048) (0.078) (0.047) (0.014) (0.057)
Observations n=436 n=436 n=432 n=534 n=324 n=212 n=427 n=427 
R2 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.02 
Note:  This table presents the regression results using OLS. Dependent variables are total scaled BTD (income) (1-6) or scaled BTD (income) relating to provisions (7) or to liabilities (8) 
respectively. In column (1) standard errors are clustered at firm level. In column (2) industry fixed effects are additionally included. The treatment variable is defined as profitability including off-
balance sheet adjustments in column (3). In column (4) the fiscal year 2012 is added to the sample. In column (5) the lagged dependent variable is included as additional control variable. In column 
(6) fiscal year 2009 is defined as placebo reform year. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below coefficients. *,**,*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Property, Plant and Equipment 
As shown before, PPE is the most relevant balance sheet item with new discretionary 
reporting leeway subsequent to the introduction of the BilMoG-Act in Germany.19 As 
depreciation schemes are generally recognized as one of the major instruments used for the 
management of taxable and book income in different directions and the descriptive analysis 
provides first evidence pointing into this direction as well, we rerun regression (1) with 
explicit focus on PPE. To that end, we use book-tax differences relating to PPE as 
alternative dependent variable and examine whether our finding also holds at single balance 
sheet level. We still control for the general level of PPE (PPEt,i) in the regression and 
additionally include the dummy variable PPE_Growtht,i,, which equals 1 if there has been a 
growth in the level of PPE (PPEt,i– PPEt-1,i >= 0) and 0 otherwise. Given that the reporting 
and depreciation options can basically only be applied to new investments, this variable is 
intended to capture the actual tax sheltering possibilities of a company. Finally, we again 
include the general economic controls described above: Leveraget,i, Sizet,i and Liquidityt,i. 
                                                     
19  For more details see Section 3. 
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Table 9: Regression results - PPE 
Dependent Variable: 
Book-tax income 
difference (PPE) 
Variable Coefficient t-
statistic
Difference in Difference Design 
Reform -0.003 -1.17
(0.003)
Profitable -0.006 -1.06
(0.006)
Profitable*Reform 0.013 1.82 * 
(0.007)
Control Variables 
Variables for different tax and accounting rules 
PPE -0.000 -0.00
(0.008)
PPE_Growth 0.006 1.54
(0.004)
Leverage -0.000 -0.59
(0.000)
Variables for additional economic factors 
Size -0.001 -0.92
(0.001)
Liquidity 0.000 0.21
(0.000)
Intercept 0.008 0.68
(0.012)
Observations 331 
R2 0.02 
Note: This table presents the regression results using OLS. The dependent variable is BTD (income) relating to PPE 
scaled by total assets. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below coefficients. *,**,*** represent significance 
levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
In this case as well, we obtain a positive and statistically significant difference-in-
difference estimate (ߙଷ,Table 9). In addition to that, the effect of the treatment group (0.01) 
still shows the same tendency as in our basic specification with total book-tax differences 
as dependent variable (0.011). This makes us confident that our findings are especially 
attributable to companies opportunistically making use of tax depreciation rules.  
Heterogeneous Reform Responses 
The ability and incentive to report opportunistically may be heterogeneous across firms and 
depend on particular company characteristics.  
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First of all, the size of a company might be decisive. When it comes to the general 
association between firm size and tax sheltering or tax avoidance, the extant evidence is 
conflicting (Guenther et al. (1997), p. 242; Chan et al. (2013), p. 7). On the one hand, 
political power theory suggests that larger firms, because they have more resources 
available for manipulating political processes in their favor, develop expertise and 
experience in tax planning and structure complex transactions to minimize tax liabilities, 
pay proportionally lower income taxes than smaller firms (Scholes et al. (1992); Siegfried 
(1972)). More precisely, given that the BilMoG-Act resulted in the implementation of new 
documentation requirements with respect to the independent exercise of tax accounting 
options, and these additional costs are expected to decrease with the size of the company 
(fixed-cost component to keep ongoing registers), larger companies may have relatively 
lower tax sheltering costs. As a result of this, these firms could be more likely to be able to 
make use of the increased scope for discretionary reporting. On the other hand, political 
cost theory posits that larger firms are subject to higher political costs; they face greater 
public and regulatory scrutiny and are therefore less tax aggressive than smaller firms 
(Boynton et al. (1992); Watts and Zimmermann (1978); Zimmermann (1983)). 
Furthermore, large companies are more likely to operate multinationally and therefore to 
have access to alternative, international tax planning and profit shifting channels. This 
could induce these large companies to focus less on tax sheltering based on discretionary 
scope in national tax reporting (Davies et al. (2014)). Considering these conflicting 
theories, we hypothesize the following:  
H2: The new reporting discretion will be used differently by companies depending on their 
size. Book-tax differences of small companies will therefore develop significantly 
different compared to book-tax differences of large companies subsequent to the 
implementation of the BilMoG-Act. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we run our basic regression equation (1) only for companies 
generally facing a tax sheltering incentive, i.e. profitable companies, and with different 
treatment groups: 
ܤܶܦ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅	ߙଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ௜ ൅ ߙଶܴ݂݁݋ݎ݉௧ ൅ ߙଷܶݎ݁ܽݐ݉݁݊ݐ௜ ∗ ܴ݂݁݋ݎ݉௧ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
ሺ2ሻ 
First of all, we conduct a median split and take Sizei, a dummy variable which equals 1 if 
the size of a company lies below the median (total assets reported on financial statements as 
of 2009) and 0 otherwise, as alternative treatment. Small firms accordingly serve as 
treatment group and large firms as control group in this specification. Given that small and 
large companies are expected to react differently to the new reporting incentives, book-tax 
differences should develop systematically different in the treatment group subsequent to the 
implementation of the BilMoG-Act. We therefore expect ߙଷ to be significant, but are 
agnostic as to whether its sign is positive or negative (ߙଷ ൐൏ 0ሻ. The control variables 
basically remain the same. Table 10 presents the results for regression equation (2). 
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Table 10: Regression results – Heterogeneous reform response 
Dependent Variable: Book-tax income difference
 (1) 
Size 
 
(2)
Subsidiaries 
 
(3) 
Direct parent 
company 
(4) 
Group parent 
company 
Reform 0.000 -0.005 0.001 0.005 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Treatment -0.010 -0.026*** -0.005 -0.017 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
Treatment*Reform 0.030 * 0.036** 0.020 0.028 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) 
PPE -0.007 0.009 0.000 0.006 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) 
Inventories 0.029 0.036 0.033 0.039 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.061) 
Financials -0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 
(0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
Provisions -0.020 -0.015 -0.009 -0.012 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Leverage -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reorganization 0.013 0.017** 0.018* 0.021** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Size -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Liquidity -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept -0.008 0.067 0.057 0.053 
(0.013) (0.067) (0.068) (0.066) 
Observations n=353 n=345 n=322 n=304 
R2 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Note: This table presents the regression results using OLS. The dependent variable is BTD (income) scaled by total assets. 
Treatment variables are defined as dummies capturing the size (1), existence of subsidiaries (2) or nationality of the direct 
(3) or group parent company (4) respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below coefficients. 
*,**,*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
We obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate (ߙଷሻ	for the interaction 
term (Size*Reform) in column (1) in line with Hypothesis 2, which we interpret as evidence 
for small companies exhibiting a systematic increase in book-tax differences compared to 
large companies subsequent to the reform. This implies that the new discretionary reporting 
scope has been mainly exploited by smaller companies. This seems to be contrary to the 
findings of Lisowsky (2010) and Chan et al. (2013) indicating that large companies are 
more likely to engage in tax sheltering. 
To further validate our conjecture that large companies focus less on tax sheltering based 
on national tax reporting because they operate multinationally and have access to other tax 
planning (profit shifting) channels, we examine three additional specifications (Table 10). 
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In order to do so, we use alternative treatment variables acting as proxy for the complexity 
and internationality of a company. In specification (2), we take a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if a company owns no subsidiaries and 0 otherwise (one or more subsidiaries) as 
treatment. In specifications (3) and (4), we define the treatment dummy as 1 if the direct 
parent or group parent company is domestic and as 0 if it is foreign. All of these 
specifications aim at identifying significant differences with regard to tax sheltering 
behavior depending on a company’s group structure. We indeed find a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient (ߙଷሻ	in column (2) implying that the reform 
systematically increased book-tax differences for those companies without subsidiaries 
(less complex firms) relative to those having subsidiaries (more complex firms). Even if we 
do not obtain statistically significant positive difference-in-difference coefficients in 
columns (3) and (4), the p-values of 0.109 and 0.119 are still remarkable, indicating that 
companies with domestic parent companies (national groups) tend to engage more in tax 
sheltering than companies with foreign parents (multinational groups). All of these findings 
corroborate the conjecture that complex and multinational corporations are less likely to 
engage in tax sheltering based on discretionary scope in national tax reporting. 
In conclusion, we provide evidence that companies with definite tax sheltering incentives 
(profitable companies) indeed exploit the new reporting discretion following the decrease 
in book-tax conformity. More precisely, our results show that companies are 
opportunistically making use of tax depreciation rules. Hence, in that regard, our results 
support the position of proponents of increased book-tax conformity. Additionally, we find 
that smaller companies featuring less complex and predominantly national group structures 
have a greater tendency to engage in opportunistic tax reporting behavior.  
6.2. Change of book-tax conformity and the persistence of taxable and financial 
income  
Using individual financial and tax statements instead of consolidated accounts, it is most 
likely that the identified change in book-tax differences (Section 6.1) can be attributed to 
tax sheltering and not earnings management which rather occurs in consolidated accounts 
reported to the financial markets. To further rule out the influence of earnings management 
on the detected change in book-tax differences, we investigate whether the information 
content of reported taxable and financial income differs pre- and post-reform. The 
reasoning behind this is that increased tax sheltering is expected to deter the quality of 
reported taxable income while increased financial earnings management would deter the 
quality of reported financial income.  
The persistence of earnings, i.e. the potential of predicting future earnings from current 
earnings, has been widely acknowledged in the literature as an appropriate measure of 
earnings quality (see Section 2.4). We therefore proceed along the lines of these studies 
(e.g. Hanlon (2005)) to oppose financial and taxable income persistence pre- and post-
reform.  
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Specifically, we are interested in the effect of the possibility to independently exercise tax 
accounting options on earnings quality (persistence of taxable income), given that there was 
virtually no possibility for tax sheltering before the BilMoG-Act. Our data allows us to 
examine the persistence of taxable income which has been shown to entail economically 
valuable information, given its incremental explanatory power for stock returns (Hanlon et 
al. (2005)). In a second step, we also consider the impact of changed conformity on 
financial accounting earnings persistence. Comparing the two outcomes provides further 
insights whether tax or financial accounts are managed opportunistically and thus are 
responsible for the observed increase in book tax differences (see Section 6.1).  
In addition to that, we provide evidence on the interplay between book-tax conformity, 
book-tax differences and earnings persistence. To the best of our knowledge, we are the 
first to do so.  
As regards the persistence of taxable income, we ex ante expect that the newly emerged 
possibility for tax sheltering deters the information content of current taxable profits for one 
year ahead taxable profits. By contrast, given that earnings management is considered to be 
irrelevant in individual financial accounts and in light of the fact that financial accounting is 
less influenced by tax law subsequent to the BilMoG-Act, we expect no change or even an 
increase in the persistence of financial income as a consequence of the change in 
conformity. We therefore frame our third hypothesis as follows: 
H 3:  The decrease in book-tax conformity arising from the implementation of the 
BilMoG-Act in Germany causes a decrease in the persistence of taxable income as a 
result of increased tax sheltering activity. By contrast, the persistence of financial 
accounting earnings remains unchanged or even improves.  
Research design 
We separately test for changes in the persistence of taxable income and financial 
accounting earnings. In doing so, we build on Hanlon (2005) and estimate for each income 
type the following OLS regression model for all firm-year observations: 
ܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧ାଵ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧ ൅ 	ߚଶܤܶܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧ ∗ ܤܶܦ	௜,௧ ൅ 	ߚସܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݁௜,௧
൅ ߚହܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧ ∗ ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݁௜,௧ ൅ 	ߝ௜,௧ 
(3) 
ܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧		denotes either taxable income or financial accounting earnings. Essentially, 
Equation (3) estimates one-year ahead earnings (scaled by total assets), ܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧ାଵ as a 
function of current period’s earnings (scaled by total assets) ܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧ in order to assess the 
general level of earnings persistence.20 In addition, we include	ܤܶܦ௜,௧, which is the absolute 
                                                     
20  Therefore, our panel is restricted to the years 2008 to 2011 in this model. 
26 
 
amount of the total book-tax income difference. Both variables are centered, i.e. the mean is 
subtracted from the predictors before fitting the regression model in order to increase 
interpretability. Additionally, we add the interaction of ܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧ ∗ ܤܶܦ	௜,௧ in order to allow 
persistence to vary across different levels of book-tax differences. In this regard, a negative 
and significant coefficient of the interaction term would, for example, suggest that earnings 
persistence is lower where total book-tax differences are larger. We also 
incorporate	ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݁௜,௧, a dummy variable indicating whether annual net income is 
positive (1) or not (0) as well as the interaction term ܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧ ∗ ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݁௜,௧ in order to 
account for the possibility that  – in line with our analysis in 6.1 – incentives and observed 
effects may be different for profitable and loss firms.21 Finally, we include year-fixed 
effects. 
We conduct a sample split to run estimation (3) for pre- and post-reform years separately. 
The idea is to compare the sign, size and significance levels, particularly of our major 
variables of interest. These are ܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧, used to determine whether the general level of 
persistence is altered by a change in book-tax conformity, and	ܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧ ∗ ܤܶܦ	௜,௧, used to 
provide answers to the question as to whether, depending on the degree of conformity, 
higher absolute book-tax differences are associated with a comparatively increased or 
decreased persistence.  
Results  
Table 11 presents the regression results of equation (3) for the persistence of taxable 
income.  
  
                                                     
21  For a similar approach see Atwood et al. (2010). 
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Table 11: Regression results: Change of book-tax conformity and taxable income persistence 
   Pre-reform (2008-2009) Post-reform (2010-2011) 
Variable Coefficient t-
statistic
Coefficient t-
statistic 
  
EARNi,t 0.710 13.70 *** 0.501 4.02 *** 
  (0.052)  (0.125)   
BTD i,t -0.221 -2.83 *** 0.032 0.47  
  (0.078)  (0.068)   
EARNi,t * BTD i,t -0.532 -1.31  -1.127 -2.73 *** 
  (0.404)  (0.413)   
Profitablei,t   0 .003 0.21  0.025 1.45  
  (0.016)   (0.018)   
EARNi,t *  Profitablei,t -0.660 -6.90 *** -0.036 -0.28  
  (0.096)  (0.131)   
Intercept 0.021 1.36 -0.013 -0.75  
  (0.015) (0.017)   
Observations n=273 n=271 
R2 0.4948 0.1872 
Note:  This table presents OLS regression results for the analysis of taxable income persistence. The dependent variable is 
one-year ahead taxable income scaled by total assets. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses below coefficients. 
*,**,*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Firstly, we find a positive and significant coefficient for ܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧ both pre- and post-reform 
which can be interpreted as the general persistence level of a company with average BTD. 
However, the coefficient and the significance level decrease, accordingly pointing to a 
decline in tax persistence induced by the decrease in book-tax conformity. We interpret this 
as an additional hint for companies engaging in tax sheltering which biases earnings and 
thus decreases their quality. Beyond this, our data also allows more specific conclusions to 
be drawn regarding the impact of book-tax differences on persistence. In that regard, we 
observe a significant and negative coefficient of the interaction term (βଷሻ, yet solely in the 
post-reform period.22 We interpret this such that higher book-tax differences induce a 
further reduction in taxable income persistence when book-tax conformity is low. Indeed, 
margins analysis of the interaction term23 for selected percentile values of BTD shows that 
the association between current period’s earnings and one-period ahead earnings decreases 
if one compares the pre- to the post-reform period. For very large BTD (99th percentile) this 
relationship even turns negative in the post-reform era. 
                                                     
22  We do not find a direct impact of book-tax differences (ߚଶሻ	in the post-reform period. 
23  Graphical results (marginsplots) are provided in Figure 2 in the Appendix. 
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We conduct the same analysis for the persistence of financial accounting earnings and 
present results in Table 12.  
Table 12: Regression results: Change of book-tax conformity and financial income persistence 
   Pre-reform (2008-2009) Post-reform (2010-2011) 
Variable Coefficient t-
statistic
Coefficient t-
statistic 
  
EARNi,t 0.391 2.28 **  0.780 3.01 *** 
  (0.172)   (0.259)   
BTD i,t -0.211 -0.90   -0.126 -0.93  
  (0.234)   (0.136)   
EARNi,t * BTD i,t -0.695 -2.28 **  -1.446 -7.48 *** 
  (0.305)   (0.193)    
Profitablei,t 0.003 0.07   0.015 0.41  
  (0.040)   (0.037)   
EARNi,t * Profitablei,t -0.078 -0.43   -0.118 -0.45  
  (0.183)   (0.263)   
Intercept 0.066 1.67 * 0.028 0.76  
  (0.039) (0.037)   
Observations n=247 n=247 
R2 0.1297 0.5241 
Note:  This table presents OLS regression results for the analysis of financial accounting earnings persistence. The 
dependent variable is one-year ahead financial income scaled by total assets. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses below coefficients. *,**,*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Again, we find a positive and significant coefficient for ܧܣܴ ௜ܰ,௧ both pre- and post-reform. 
Unlike for taxable income, however, the magnitude of 	ߚଵ rises subsequent to the 
introduction of the BilMoG-Act. In principle, this insight indicates an increase in earnings 
persistence induced by a decrease in book-tax conformity which is in line with empirical 
evidence previously provided (Hanlon et al. (2008), Atwood et al. (2010)). Specifically for 
our setting, this observation makes us confident that the observed book-tax differences in 
2010 indeed relates to tax sheltering, rather than to distortive earnings management which 
expectedly would negatively impact on earnings quality. We therefore conclude that the 
BilMoG-Act did not induce earnings management in single financial accounts. Moreover, 
the evidence of increased financial accounting quality is in line with book-tax conformity 
opponents’ claim that the two reporting lines serve different information needs and that 
earnings quality is superior when the determination of earnings is not influenced by tax 
law. Indeed, before enactment of the BilMoG, the reverse authoritative principle caused 
such an impact of tax reporting on financial accounts (see Section 3). 
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As regards the general impact of book-tax differences, we do not find a direct impact of 
book-tax differences (ߚଶ) on one-year ahead earnings, whereas we do observe a significant 
and negative coefficient of the interaction term (ߚଷሻ.Once again we conclude that higher 
book-tax differences induce a reduction in earnings persistence. This is in line with 
Hanlon’s (2005) finding and generally holds true for both pre- and post-BilMoG periods. 
However, the magnitude and the significance level of ߚଷ notably increases after the 
decrease in conformity. Despite the fact that we can observe a general increase in earnings 
persistence, we therefore conclude that large book-tax differences seem to have an even 
stronger negative impact on one-year ahead financial income if book-tax conformity 
decreases.  This is also in line with margins analysis (Figure 2 in the Appendix) which 
shows that - unlike in the case of taxable income – the general association between current 
and one-period ahead earnings improves pre- vs. post-reform. Only if very large BTD (e.g. 
99th percentile) are assessed, the earnings-future earnings relation is negative with the 
slope coefficient being even more negative post-reform.  
To sum up, we observe a general decline in the persistence of taxable income as a 
consequence of the change in conformity. We attribute this decline in the quality of taxable 
income as an alternative earnings and performance figure to the distortive impact of the 
newly arisen scope for tax sheltering. As such, this finding supports the position of 
proponents of increased book-tax conformity. By contrast, our evidence suggests that the 
decrease in book-tax conformity induces a general increase in the persistence of financial 
accounting earnings. We take this as indication that there is no earnings management in 
individual accounts and thus conclude that that the general quality (informativeness) of 
financial accounting earnings has increased. Moreover, this insight is in line with the 
argumentation that both lines of reporting serve the information needs of different 
recipients and that the informativeness of earnings is enhanced when their determination is 
not affected by tax law. Moreover, this finding is in accordance with previous empirical 
literature predominantly suggesting that higher conformity deters overall financial 
accounting earnings quality. For both income types, higher book-tax differences adversely 
affect persistence. This effect is, however, more pronounced in a context of low 
conformity. 
7. Conclusion 
Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment (the BilMoG-Act) in Germany and using a sample of 
linked individual financial statements and actual tax return data, we explicitly examine the 
effects of a change in book-tax conformity on reporting behavior.  
We show that the new reporting leeway resulting from a transition from a one-book to a 
more two-book-oriented accounting system indeed seems to be used. In our descriptive 
analysis, this is reflected in a positive total book-tax difference and a positive book-tax 
difference relating to PPE, constituting the balance sheet item with the largest scope for tax 
sheltering, in year 2010. Based on a difference-in-difference design, we demonstrate that 
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profitable companies - facing a clear tax sheltering incentive - exhibit comparably higher 
book-tax differences subsequent to the decrease in conformity. This can particularly be 
traced back to book-tax differences relating to PPE and thus to companies making use of 
favorable tax depreciation rules. Furthermore, we find that small firms featuring less 
complex and predominantly national group structures are more likely to engage in 
opportunistic tax reporting behavior. Overall, these results support the position of 
proponents of increased book-tax conformity. 
We also examine how the change in book-tax conformity affects the persistence of taxable 
and financial income. Our results suggest that a decrease in book-tax conformity induces a 
decline in the persistence of taxable income which we attribute to the distortive impact of 
the newly arisen tax sheltering options. In contrast to that, we observe a higher persistence 
of financial accounting earnings, thus corroborating our finding that earnings management 
is not driving our results. This finding is also in line with the arguments put forward by the 
opponents of increased conformity, who maintain that both accounting lines provide 
divergent information content parts of which are lost in case of an alignment. Moreover, 
our results suggest that large book-tax differences have a negative impact on one-year-
ahead (taxable and financial) income. This effect is, however, more pronounced in a 
context of decreased conformity and therefore yet another argument in favor of high 
conformity. 
To sum up, we show that a switch from high to low book-tax conformity going along with 
accounting options creates room for opportunistic reporting which indeed is exploited for 
tax sheltering despite higher documentation costs. This finding speaks against such a shift 
towards a two-book system. At the same time, we show that detaching financial and taxable 
income increases the persistence of financial income, thus suggesting an increased 
information content of financial earnings in a two-book system. Essentially, the reduced 
persistence of taxable income post-reform, however, indicates that earnings quality 
deteriorates in a two-book system if incentives for opportunistic behavior are present. 
Hence, we conclude that a switch from high to low book-tax conformity increases 
opportunistic reporting behavior while not improving the information content with regard 
to those reported income numbers for which opportunistic reporting incentives are present. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Overview of authoritative principle pre- and post-BilMoG 
Commercial 
code 
Tax law Pre-BilMoG Post-BilMoG 
Compulsory 
regulation 
No regulation BS = TBS authoritative principle BS = TBS authoritative principle 
Compulsory 
regulation 
Option BS = TBS authoritative principle (pseudo 
option) 
BS =/≠ TBS (abolishment of reverse 
authoritative principle) 
Compulsory 
regulation 
Compulsory 
regulation 
BS =/≠ TBS precedence of tax law (departure 
from authoritative principle) 
BS =/≠ TBS precedence of tax law (departure 
from authoritative principle) 
Option Compulsory 
regulation 
BS =/≠ TBS precedence of tax law (departure 
from authoritative principle) 
BS =/≠ TBS precedence of tax law (departure 
from authoritative principle) 
Option No regulation BS =/≠ TBS authoritative principle * BS =/≠ TBS authoritative principle * 
Option Option BS = TBS reverse authoritative principle BS =/≠ TBS (abolishment of reverse 
authoritative principle) 
 
  
 
(BS = Balance Sheet; TBS=Tax Balance Sheet) *Assets must be recognized for tax purposes, 
Liabilities may not be recognized 
 
 
Note: This table provides an overview of the impact of the (reverse) authoritative principle with regard to potential deviations between financial and tax accounting, pre- and post-
reform.  
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Table 2: Overview of accounting items with BTD pre- and post-BilMoG  
Assets 
        Deviations   
        Deviation deterministic/discretionary  divergence/ 
convergence 
Balance sheet item German GAAP pre-
BilMoG 
German GAAP post-
BilMoG 
Tax Balance Sheet pre-BilMoG post-BilMoG with regard to 
financial 
accounting 
with regard to 
tax balance 
sheet 
* 
Fixed Assets                 
Intangible assets                 
Internally created 
intangible assets 
Capitalization prohibited Option to capitalize Capitalization prohibited  no possible discretionary deterministic divergence 
Derivative goodwill Option to capitalize Capitalization required Capitalization required possible no deterministic deterministic convergence 
Tangible assets                 
Buildings Subsequent costs of 
acquisition: capitalization 
required (irrespective of 
distance of time and amount of 
costs relative to initial 
acquisition) 
Subsequent costs of 
acquisition: capitalization 
required (irrespective of 
distance of time and amount of 
costs relative to initial 
acquisition) 
Expenses for 
maintenance/modernisation 
within 3 years after acquisition 
and in excess of 15% of initial 
expenses: capitalization 
required  
possible possible deterministic deterministic - 
Low-value assets ≤ 150 EUR: immediately 
expensed; or capitalization and 
deprecation (useful life) 
 > 150 EUR, ≤ 410 EUR: 
immediately expensed; or 
capitalization and deprecation 
(useful life); or pool 
depreciation (5 years) (only if 
not material) 
 > 410 EUR, ≤ 1.000 EUR: 
capitalization and deprecation 
(useful life); or pool 
depreciation (5 years) (only if 
not material) 
≤150EUR: immediately 
expensed; or capitalization and 
deprecation (useful life)  
> 150 EUR, ≤ 410 EUR: 
immediately expensed; or 
capitalization and deprecation 
(useful life); or pool 
depreciation (5 years) (only if 
not material)  
> 410 EUR, ≤ 1.000 EUR: 
capitalization and deprecation 
(useful life); or pool 
depreciation (5 years) (only if 
not material) 
≤150EUR: immediately 
expensed; or capitalization and 
deprecation (useful life) 
> 150 EUR, ≤ 410 EUR: 
immediately expensed; or 
capitalization and deprecation 
(useful life); or pool 
depreciation (5 years)               
> 410 EUR, ≤ 1.000 EUR: 
capitalization and deprecation 
(useful life); or pool 
depreciation (5 years)  
no possible discretionary discretionary divergence 
Financial assets                 
Shares in affiliated 
companies 
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Shares in partnerships                 
Recognition Acquisition costs Acquisition costs Distinct, divergent valuation 
method ("mirror image 
method")  
yes yes deterministic deterministic - 
Subsequent 
measurement 
Permanent impairment: write-
down required; non-permanent 
impairment: write-down 
optional 
Permanent impairment: write-
down required; non-permanent 
impairment: write-down 
optional 
Write-down prohibited possible (non-
permanent 
impairment)/ 
yes (permanent 
impairment) 
possible (non-
permanent 
impairment)/ 
yes (permanent 
impairment) 
discretionary 
(non-
permanent 
impairment) 
/deterministic  
(permanent 
impairment) 
deterministic - 
Current assets                 
Inventories                 
Simplifying valuation 
methods 
Fifo, Lifo, Hifo; weighted 
average 
Fifo, Lifo; weighted average Lifo; weighted average no possible discretionary discretionary divergence 
Receivables                 
Dividend receivables Capitalization required (under 
certain conditions) 
Capitalization required (under 
certain conditions) 
Capitalization prohibited yes yes deterministic deterministic - 
Bad debt allowance Permanent impairment: write-
down required; non-permanent 
impairment: write-down 
optional 
Permanent impairment: write-
down required; non-permanent 
impairment: write-down 
optional 
Permanent impairment: write-
down optional; non-permanent 
impairment: write-down 
prohibited 
no (permanent 
impairment) / 
possible (non-
permanent 
impairment) 
possible discretionary deterministic 
(non-
permanent 
impairment)/ 
discretionary 
(permanent 
impairment) 
divergence 
Production costs                 
Materials and 
production overhead; 
depreciation  
Option to capitalize Capitalization required Capitalization required possible no deterministic deterministic convergence 
General administration 
costs, expenses for 
social purposes, 
voluntary social 
benefits, company 
pension scheme  
Option to capitalize Option to capitalize Option to capitalize no possible discretionary discretionary divergence 
Interest Option to capitalize Option to capitalize Option to capitalize no possible discretionary discretionary divergence 
Research and 
distribution costs 
Capitalization prohibited Capitalization prohibited Capitalization prohibited no no deterministic deterministic - 
Depreciation                 
General principles Rational commercial judgment 
(no statutory specification of 
method); switch from 
declining balance method to 
straight line depreciation 
possible 
Rational commercial judgment 
(no statutory specification of 
method); switch from 
declining balance method to 
straight line depreciation 
possible 
Straight line (useful life; 
indication: "AfA-Tables") or 
unit-of-production method; 
declining balance method 
applicable only until 
31.12.2010 
no possible discretionary discretionary divergence 
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Fixed assets                 
Intangible assets Depreciation according to 
expected useful life (< 20 
years; straight line method 
unless another method is better 
suited to the usage pattern)  
Depreciation according to 
expected useful life (< 20 
years; straight line method 
unless another method is better 
suited to the usage pattern) 
Straight line method (useful 
life) 
possible possible discretionary deterministic 
(method), 
discretionary 
(length of 
useful life) 
- 
Goodwill straight line (4 years) or 
straight line (useful life) 
straight line 5 years (otherwise 
justification necessary) 
Straight line, 15 years possible possible discretionary deterministic - 
Tangible assets Rational commercial judgment Rational commercial judgment Straight line (useful life; 
indication: "AfA-Tables") or 
unit-of-production method; 
declining balance method 
applicable only until 
31.12.2010 
no possible discretionary discretionary divergence 
Buildings Rational commercial judgment Rational commercial judgment Straight line (33-50 years)  possible possible discretionary deterministic - 
Exceptional 
depreciation 
                
Fixed assets                 
Non-permanent 
impairment 
Write-down optional 
(companies of certain legal 
status: only in case of financial 
assets) 
write-down optional (but 
limited to financial assets) 
Write-down prohibited possible possible 
(financial 
assets) 
discretionary deterministic - 
Permanent impairment Write-down required Write-down required Write-down optional  no possible deterministic discretionary divergence 
Current assets                 
Non-permanent 
impairment 
Write-down required ("strict 
lowest value principle") 
Write-down required ("strict 
lowest value principle") 
Write-down prohibited yes yes deterministic deterministic - 
Permanent impairment Write-down required ("strict 
lowest value principle") 
Write-down required ("strict 
lowest value principle") 
Write-down optional  no possible deterministic discretionary divergence 
                  
Special tax 
depreciation 
Reverse authoritative 
principle: adoption of special 
tax depreciation 
Abolishment of reverse 
authoritative principle: no 
adoption of special tax 
depreciation 
Diverse, e.g. accelerated 
depreciation (promotion of 
SME); valuation discounts; 
increased depreciation 
(restored buildings) 
no possible discretionary discretionary divergence 
Pre-paid expenses                 
Tariffs/Excise 
taxes/value added tax 
on customer advances 
Capitalization optional Capitalization prohibited Capitalization required possible yes deterministic deterministic divergence 
Debt discount Capitalization optional Capitalization optional Capitalization required possible possible discretionary deterministic - 
 
*Deviation: implied divergence or convergence of book and tax income? ( - : no change/no clear tendency) 
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Liabilities 
        Deviations   
        Deviation deterministic/ 
discretionary 
divergence/ 
convergence 
Balance sheet item German GAAP pre-
BilMoG 
German GAAP post-
BilMoG 
Tax Balance Sheet pre-BilMoG post-BilMoG with regard to 
financial 
accounting 
with regard to 
tax balance 
sheet 
* 
Equity                 
Special item with 
reserve component 
Recognition optional Recognition prohibited Recognition optional 
(reinvestment reserve, subsidy 
reserve, replacement reserve, 
gains from confusion) 
no possible - discretionary divergence 
Provisions                 
Pension provisions                 
Recognition                 
Pension provisions  
(New provisions) 
Recognition required 
(uncertain liability)  
Recognition required 
(uncertain liability)  
Recognition required if 
conditions fulfilled, otherwise 
recognition prohibited 
possible possible deterministic deterministic no change 
Pension provisions  
(Existing provisions) 
Recognition optional Recognition optional Recognition optional (as 
German GAAP) 
no no - - no change 
Indirect commitments 
from pension promise  
Recognition optional  Recognition optional  Recognition prohibited possible possible discretionary - no change 
Measurement                 
General measurement No requirement concerning 
measurement, modified 
discount value method 
No requirement concerning 
measurement, possibly 
transition to projected unit 
credit method, no modified 
discount value method 
Modified discount value 
method (proceedings for equal 
distribution) 
possible possible deterministic deterministic divergence 
Consideration of 
salary and pension 
trends 
Depending on economic 
situation (following tax law) 
Consideration required Consideration prohibited possible yes deterministic deterministic divergence 
Discounting Depending on economic 
situation 3-6% (following tax 
law) 
Required, average market 
interest rate of previous 7 
years, option for general fixing 
at 15 years 
Required, 6% possible possible deterministic deterministic divergence 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
41 
 
Vacation provisions Consideration of pay increases 
after balance sheet date, yearly 
agreed-upon fringe benefits 
such as bonuses, allocations to 
pension provisions, 
proportionate overhead costs; 
for determining of daily rate: 
actual working days usually 
220 days per year 
Consideration of pay increases 
after balance sheet date, yearly 
agreed-upon fringe benefits 
such as bonuses, allocations to 
pension provisions, 
proportionate overhead costs;  
for determining of daily rate: 
actual working days usually 
220 days per year 
No consideration of pay 
increases after balance sheet 
date, yearly agreed-upon fringe 
benefits such as bonuses, 
allocations to pension 
provisions, proportionate 
overhead costs;  
for determining of daily rate: 
regular working days (250 
working days per year) 
possible possible deterministic deterministic - 
Other provisions                 
Recognition                 
Provisions for 
contingent losses 
Recognition required Recognition required Recognition prohibited yes yes deterministic deterministic no change 
Provisions for deferred 
maintenance (catching 
up within three 
months)  
Recognition required Recognition required Recognition required, only for 
liabilities against third parties  
possible possible deterministic deterministic no change 
Provisions for deferred 
maintenance(catching 
up after three months 
but within the 
following financial 
year) 
Recognition optional Recognition prohibited Recognition prohibited possible no - - convergence 
Provisions for 
infringement of 
patents, authority or 
similar property rights 
If sufficiently concretized 
recognition required, otherwise 
prohibited 
If sufficiently concretized 
recognition required, otherwise 
prohibited 
Under certain conditions 
recognition required, otherwise 
prohibited 
possible possible deterministic deterministic no change 
Provisions for 
anniversary bonuses 
Recognition required Recognition required Only under certain conditions 
recognition required, otherwise 
prohibited  
possible possible deterministic deterministic no change 
Provisions for costs to 
be capitalized in future 
periods  
Recognition required Recognition required Recognition prohibited yes yes deterministic deterministic no change 
Provisions for 
harmless disposal of 
radioactive waste 
material  
Recognition required Recognition required Recognition prohibited yes yes deterministic deterministic no change 
Provisions that only 
need to be fulfilled 
when future earnings 
or gains accrue 
Recognition required Recognition required Recognition prohibited, only 
when earnings or gains accrue  
yes yes deterministic deterministic no change 
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Measurement                 
General measurement Settlement amount according 
to rational commercial 
judgement 
Settlement amount according 
to rational commercial 
judgement 
Settlement amount possible possible deterministic 
(possibly 
powers of 
discretion: 
discretionary) 
deterministic 
(possibly 
powers of 
discretion: 
discretionary) 
no change 
Future price and cost 
increases 
Consideration prohibited Consideration required Consideration prohibited no yes deterministic deterministic divergence 
Discounting (maturity 
> 1 year)  
Prohibited Required, average market 
interest rate of previous 7 years
Required, 5.5% yes possible deterministic deterministic no clear 
tendency/conver
gence 
Liabilities                 
Recognition                 
Liabilities that need 
only be fulfilled when 
future earnings or 
gains accrue 
Recognition required (rational 
commercial judgement) 
Recognition required (rational 
commercial judgement) 
Recognition prohibited, only 
when earnings or gains accrue  
yes yes deterministic deterministic no change 
Measurement                 
General measurement Value at time of accrual or 
higher repayment amount 
respectively 
Settlement amount (Discounted) settlement 
amount 
possible possible deterministic deterministic no change 
Discounting (maturity 
> 1 year)  
No present value estimate No present value estimate Required, 5.5% yes yes deterministic deterministic no change 
Reflection of 
uncertainty 
Rational commercial discretion Rational commercial discretion Going-concern value, 
consideration of probability 
that only part of the liability 
needs to be fulfilled 
possible possible deterministic deterministic no change 
 
* Deviation: implied divergence or convergence of book and tax income? ( - : no change/no clear tendency) 
Note: This table lists (possible) deviations between financial and tax accounting at the level of single balance sheet items, pre- and post-reform. 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   Pooled  
(2008-2012) 
Pre-BilMoG 
(2008-2009) 
Post-BilMoG 
(2010-2012) 
BTD  -0.001 -0.006 0.003 
  (0.082) (0.071) (0.092) 
Profitability  0.847 0.844 0.849 
  (0.360) (0.363) (0.358) 
PPE  0.142 0.147 0.137 
  (0.199) (0.201) (0.197) 
Inventories  0.113 0.109 0.118 
  (0.169) (0.162) (0.176) 
Financials  0.224 0.225 0.223 
  (0.322) (0.322) (0.321) 
Provisions  0.167 0.170 0.165 
  (0.190) (0.191) (0.189) 
Leverage  20.005 16.327 23.656 
  (115.731) (85.228) (139.645) 
Reorganization  0.188 0.214 0.163 
  (0.391) (0.411) (0.370) 
Size  17.410 17.400 17.419 
  (1.967) (1.942) (1.994) 
Liquidity  126.377 226.554 27.933 
  (2592.468) (3678.415) (181.622) 
Note: This table displays the mean of the variables used in the regression analysis for the full sample (1) or a sample split 
for the years 2008-2009 pre-reform (2) and the years 2010-1012 post-reform (3) respectively. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses.  
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix 
  BTD Profitability PPE Inventories Financials Provisions Leverage Reorgani-zation Size Liquidity 
BTD 1.0000 
Profitability 0.1005* 1.0000
PPE -0.0246 0.0391 1.0000
Inventories 0.0503 0.1169* 0.0331 1.0000
Financials -0.0460 -0.1274* -0.3397* -0.3139* 1.0000
Provisions -0.0327 0.1010* 0.0247 0.0214 -0.3800* 1.0000
Leverage -0.0070 0.0066 -0.0501 -0.0017 -0.0912 0.0541 1.0000
Reorganization -0.0868 -0.0832 -0.1063 -0.0439  -0.0430 0.0698 -0.0602 1.0000
Size -0.0998* 0.0379 0.1700* -0.1240* 0.2832* 0.0185 -0.0305 0.0780 1.0000
Liquidity  -0.0077  -0.0883 -0.0261 -0.0299  -0.0299 -0.0343 -0.0078 -0.0191 -0.0636 1.0000
Note: This table displays the correlation between the variables used in the regression analysis. * represents a 1% significance level.
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Figure 2: Marginsplot analysis for the 50th and 99th percentile of BTD, pre-vs. post-
reform
Panel a: Taxable income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel b: Financial accounting earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure shows graphical results (marginsplots) for the margins analysis of the interaction term EARNi,t * BTD i,t 
for the 50th and 99th percentile of BTD, separated for the pre- and post-reform period. Panel a contains results for taxable 
income, panel b for financial accounting earnings. The dashed grey 45°-line serves as a reference indicating perfect 
persistence. 
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